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Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries are at a historic point as they 
stand at the door step of the European Union (EU). Much like the second 
European enlargement, the accession of CEE countries is clearly tied to a desire 
to help foster the growth of democracy-capitalism in these formerly communist 
countries. Research has shown that citizen support for these newly 
democratizing political systems is important for the stability of democracy in the 
region. Will citizen support play as crucial a role in the successful integration of 
CEE countries into the European Union? The following analysis examines 
public support for membership in the European Union amongst five applicant 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Drawing from both the enlargement 
literature and public opinion scholarship the study posits a set of testable 
hypotheses highlighting the main factors influencing citizen attitudes towards 
EU membership. In the second part of the article. I empirically test these 
alternative hypotheses using data from a 1996 survey. The findings challenge 
dominant explanations for public opinion in member states, and suggests how 






















































































































































































Central and eastern European (CEE) countries are at a historic point as they 
stand on the door step to the European Union (EU). The European Union is 
similarly in an unprecedented position. The number of applicant countries and 
the socio-political differences between them and present EU member states are 
larger than ever before. Currently, ten countries from central and eastern Europe 
have applied for membership, and five have begun EU membership 
negotiations.1 In March of 1998, the EU adopted legislation outlining the 
economic conditions and principles that will guide the accession process in each 
CEE country." Coupled with this commitment to market reforms, the 
enlargement is also tied to a desire to help foster the growth and development of 
democracy-capitalism in these former communist countries.
Does public opinion make a difference to these reforms and to the eastern 
enlargement of the EU? The volatile Maastricht referenda in Denmark and 
France, and the unsuccessful Norwegian accession referenda suggest the 
significant impact popular attitudes and actions can have on EU politics. More 
generally, mass attitudes have been critical to the rise of democracy in central 
and eastern Europe and they continue to play a crucial role in the consolidation 
of democratic institutions and the implementation of market reforms (Mishler 
and Rose 1997; Linz & Stephan 1996). Similarly, mass attitudes appear to be 
crucial to the success of new institutions and reforms associated with the process 
of European integration. While scholars have focused on the factors influencing 
these attitudes in member state countries (e.g. Anderson 1998; Dalton & 
Eichenberg 1998, Eichenberg & Dalton 1993; Gabel 1998; Gabel & Whitten 
1997; Inglehart 1970; 1977; Shepherd 1975), we lack a systematic explanation 
of mass support in applicant countries. Is public opinion in applicant countries 
shaped by a different dynamic than in member countries? Do democratic and 
market reforms serve as catalysts for EU support? These questions are of 
increasing significance: the EU is experiencing a historic low in public support 
and there appears to be a renewed commitment, among scholars and heads of 
government, to view citizens as an integral part of the European project.3
The following analysis examines public support for EU membership in 
the five applicant CEE countries recommended for the first phase of the next 
enlargement; the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. The 
purpose of the analysis is twofold. First, it contributes to a growing body of 
scholarship which examines the correlates of public opinion and European 
integration; in particular, this analysis represents one of the first cross-national 
studies of public opinion in applicant countries. Second, the analysis offers 
comparative research on the interplay between domestic politics and 



























































































domestic dynamics of public support, this study provides a guide for 
understanding not only the prospects for successful EU enlargement, but also 
how enlargement is related to the stability of democracy in the region.
The analysis seeks to explain the variation in citizen attitudes cross- 
nationally at two levels. First. 1 examine aggregate levels of support. This 
aggregate variation is significant for a nation's membership potential. Second, 
the analysis focuses on the factors that influence individual attitudes of EU 
support within each nation. The first section discusses the relevant theoretical 
perspectives that might help to explain variation. Given the relative paucity of 
research on support for integration in applicant countries. I develop a set of 
hypotheses based on general theories of support for integration and research on 
past enlargements. Consistent with this past research. I conceptualize citizen 
support for the EU j
for individual attitudes about European integration. The second section tests the 
validity of these hypotheses using data from a 1996 survey carried out in the five 
countries.
Historical CEE - EU Linkages
How do citizens form specific opinions about distant international 
institutions which possess little formal association with their country? While 
these publics do not belong to the European Union, their governments have been 
engaged in a variety of EU-related policies since 1990.4 In 1992, the European 
Agreements established formal trade links between the EU and Poland, Hungary 
and the former Czechoslovakia. The Agreements implemented considerable 
market liberalizing reforms, such as the removal of EU restrictions on industrial 
goods, with the ultimate goal of setting up a free trade zone between the EU and 
CEE countries by the year 2002. Thus, the Agreements represent a considerable 
shift for both CEE economies and political systems towards compliance with the 
supranational standards constructed by the EU. More recently in 1995, the EU 
established a free-trade agreement with Estonia, and the other Baltic states, 
which provided “unrestricted” access for manufacturers into the EU (Barnes and 
Barnes 1995). However, the more formal links associated with the European 
Agreements were still awaiting ratification in both Estonia and Slovenia at the 
time of this study.
Over the last three to six years, the citizens of the five CEE countries have 
also begun to witness the political debates that accompany these adjustments 
(see Kolankiewicz 1994). “Europe” remains a dominant political issue in these 
countries. The impact of political events such as the recent resignation and 
reinstatement of Czech Prime Minister Klaus and the pending Hungarian general




























































































election are discussed in terms of its effect on EU accession (Robinson 1997; 
Anderson & Done 1997). As the historical linkages to the EU. and thus political 
salience of the EU. vary across the five countries, one would also expect a 
variation in aggregate levels of EU support. The longer a country is involved in_ 
relations with the EU. the more likely its populous will hold a favorable opinion 
(or at least decided opinion) of European integration. Scholars have shown that-  
This "socialization' effect influences public support both within member state 
countneS^^raT so  amongst citizens in applicant countries (Anderson & 
Kaltenthaler 1996; Inglehart 1977; Tsoukalis 1981).
i t t r j  p f o u e r f '  ----m o m  G,
Oc4,\
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES AND PAST ENLARGEMENTS
While little systematic public opinion research has been carried out in applicant 
countries, accounts of the political debates taking place in the applicant 
countries can provide us with a general understanding of citizen attitudes. In 
particular, this study will draw from scholarship examining the European 
Community’ sJE C ) first enlargement (United Kingdom. Denmarji^lreland- 
January y^W T i))  and second enlargement (Greece- January 1,198 lf)Spain. 
Portugal- Tapaaty 1. 1986). The third enlargement (Austria. FinlandTMveden- 
January K" 1995) is less relevant to the CEE case, as it involved a relatively 
homogenous group of small wealthy countries with long traditions of democracy 
and open trade with Europe.
Furthermore, the analysis draws from a well established body of • 
scholarship examining the determinants of public support for European 
integration in member state countries. This scholarship has developed in terms 
of three_gensraL models: utilitarian, value and political economic perspectives. 
The perspective suggests that individual attitudes result from a
costTBenef'it calculation in the context of welfare losses and gains associated 
with integration (e.g. Gabel 1998). Historically one of the first explanations to 
be examined by public opinion scholars, theiivalue Inersnective. argues that 
political values and cognitive capabilities affecTTT citizen’s ability to form 
concrete opinions about abstract and distant institutions, such as the European 
Union (e.g. Inglehart 1970; 1977). Finally, the political economic. approach 
adopts a traditional comparative argument that -“pSHfR?- maCTS^economic 
conditions are more likely to leave citizens with positive evaluations of 
government performance and applies this model to citizen support for EU 
policies and performance (see Gabel & Palmer 1995).
In an ever changing European Union, the continued utility of these 
sometimes rigid models has come into question (e.g. Eichenberg 1998). In 




























































































current decline in citizen support for the EU and instead suggested the opposite. 
However, there is considerable consensus around the need to reevaluate rather 
than discard these models: in particular, future work ought to elaborate on the 
general models, by examining new variables which reflect an evolving, rather 
than a static EU (Eichenberg 1998: Anderson & Kaltenthaler 1998). The 
following analysis contributes to this réévaluation. In particular, this section 
provides a brief review of the defining variables associated with the utilitarian 
and value perspectives and posits how these approaches can be elaborated to 
examine the central and eastern European case. The subsequent section tests the 
explanatory power of these alternative models. The analysis focuses on these 
two approaches, rather than all three, as the hypotheses driving the political 
economic model are less relevant and instructive to these applicant countries. 
The political economic model relies heavily on a citizen's attitudes towards EU 
government performance, and as CEE citizens are not yet formally governed by 
these institutions their opinions about specific EU governing structures and 
policies are less developed.
Economic Perceptions
The relationship between economic conditions and a citizen’s support for 
national political institutions is well established in the literature (see Lewis-Beck 
1988; Norpoth, et. al. 1991). Thus, one way of understanding this relationship 
between utilitarian variables and EU support is through an individual’s 
perceived economic well-being. An individual’s ability to evaluate whether they 
will gain or lose from membership is viewed through the perceptions of their 
current economic reality. Consistent with the conclusions derived from 
economic voting models, Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) hypothesize that 
perceptions of personal economic well-being, not only objective economic 
measures, influence the public’s evaluations of political issues.5 Their findings 
demonstrate that personal economic evaluations are positively related to support 
for integration. Gabel and Whitten (1997) test this relationship by examining 
evaluations of household financial situation and support for the EU. Similarly, 
they also find that support for integration is positively jglatetL-to-a-eitraenrV- 
perceived household financial well-being.
The economic costs and benefits of joining a free trade agreement have 
also been a key issue for the public in applicant countries. A series of surveys, 
conducted between 1950-1972 in the UK, revealed a grôwing hostility towards 
joining the Community.6 Scholars agree that these attitudes were primarily 
motivated by economic concerns with joining the common market (Shepherd 
1975; Preston 1997). A similar trend was found in both Denmark and Ireland. 
These findings were not based on systematic public opinion research, however 




























































































membership was largely governed by a concern to maintain their main export 
markets (UK and Germany). One scholar describes the Danish internal debates 
regarding future membership as “driven by rational economic calculations of 
national interest which overruled any misgivings concerning the possible 
political shape of the Communities” (Preston 1997, p. 42). Similarly, the Irish 
national debates were shaped in terms of economic concerns with the 
vulnerability of Irish industry and, in particular, the predominance of the 
agriculture sector in their economy (Preston 1997).
How do these findings enlighten our understanding of economic concerns 
in the central and eastern European case? The applicability of these findings to 
CEE countries is not readily certain. For example, Czechs experiencing 
economic hardships may look positively towards future financial opportunities 
created through EU membership. Or Hungarians may see their current 
household financial stability as a result of market liberalizing reforms, and so 
would favor future EU membership as a way to ensure the continuation and 
permanence of these reforms. However, given what we know about those most 
“hurt” by market reforms (labor, pensioners, farmers), the EU does not offer 
them a quick resolution to their economic hardships (Shepherd 1975). European 
integration stands as the further institutionalization of free market reforms, a 
prospect not necessarily welcomed by these individuals. Thus, the utilitarian 
model would argue that those individuals possessing negative evaluations of 
their household financial situation are more likely to favor a return to a previous . 
economic order or at least not favor the elaboration of free market reforms. 
Consistent with this argument, we might expect economic perceptions to be an 
underlying factor in forming attitudes about European integration. Therefore, we 
hypothesize that: CEE £iii7f>ns-pnxxexsing positive evaluations o f their personal 
finflnciqL Mtuation-are_mofe-likel\ ta support-membership Jn  the European
Democracy
In the CEE context, EU membership is viewed not only in terms of economic 
living standard increases; but it also means strengthening the institutional base 
for democracy and capitalism. The consolidation of democratic institutions is as 
much an interest to these citizens as personal economic benefit (Lieven 1997). 
Wider European unity is conceptualized in terms of stabilizing democratic 
norms as they develop in the post-communist societies of central and eastern 
Europe. Debates surrounding the enlargement of the European Union eastward 
are explicit in regards to the political goals to be achieved:
‘The objective must be to ensure that the fuil potential of enlargement is 
developed to strengthen the European model, namely a Europe built on a 




























































































democracy with those of an open economy underpinned by market forces.
internal solidarity and cohesion.....Enlargement is an investment in peace._
stability and^rrosperit^-for-the people of Europe" (European Commission
ÏW77pr55Tl33).
The motivations behind the CEE interest in joining the Union is also not unlike 
that of applicant countries involved in the second phase of European 
enlargement. While economic benefits were certainly part of their cost/benefit 
calculations, these newly democratizing countries applied for membership in 
order to stabilize and consolidate their new political institutions. Accession 
would decrease their chances of reverting back to authoritarian regimes 
(Wallace 1989). The public attitudes towards future ECrrierribership in Greece.
\  Portugal and Spain show this relationship. Upon ratification of Portugal's 
democratic constitution in 1976. the Soares government stated that the continued 
\  political stability of Portugal was closely linked to its political and economic 
integration with the EC. Public discussions further emphasized this point by 
suggesting that the EC was a “means to consolidate this new regime” (Tsoukalis 
1981, p. 117). The Spanish accession involved a similar consensus around 
the. utility of integration for democratic consolidation. During the transition 
period following Franco’s death in 1975, all political parties remained in 
agreement over membership in the EC. While the political debates were infused 
with different expectations of membership, parties agreed (except for the 
extreme left and extreme right) that membership in the Community would help 
to consolidate the new democratic regime. As one scholar observed. “Europe 
became almost a symbol of democracy for Alost Spaniards” (Tsoukalis 1981, p.
122). V
Similarly, we might expect CEE citizens to link accession to the 
continuation and permanence oFlfieir new democracies. European integration 
becomes the brtjdge to democratic dreams as symbolized in the West. Yet for the 
practical knowfedge of what exactly this democracy entails, CEE citizens rely 
on personal expérience from the democratic reforms in their country. As Mishler 
and Rose (1997, p. 6) argue, the citizens of these new democracies “have little 
experience in the workings of democratic institutions and even less formal 
training in abstract democratic norms and principles” and thus public support is 
“experiential”. If the EU represents a reinforcement of democratic institutions, 
the CEE citizens may understand these institutions with reference to the costs 
and benefits they have experienced with national political reforms since the fall 
of the Communist regime. Similar to the effect of economic perceptions, a 
utilitarian model would argue that individual attitudes about democracy may 
affect levels of EU support. If they are satisfied with the democracy they have 
experienced so far, they are more likely to favor the permanence and 




























































































citizens possessing greater satisfaction with democracy in tlieir country are 
more likely to support membership in the European Union.
Free Market Economy
While scholars have explored the general relationship between public opinion 
and market reforms in new democracies, we have not yet explored how this 
relationship can affect levels of EU support (Przeworski 1996: Stokes 19961. 
However, one might expect a similar effect as hypothesized for attitudes about 
democracy. EU support may be linked to the benefits of establishing a free 
market economy. By integrating into an economic framework based on capitalist 
ideals, the central and eastern European countries can help secure the success of 
their new economic reforms. CEE politicians are keenly aware of this 
relationship and view the EU as a mechanism to stabilize their market reforms. 
Furthermore, like the political statements made by member state governments, 
these pnliticians-tise the -EUrtrrartri ‘degitfmacy and credibility" to their domestic. 
reforms (Moravcsif 199^ p S1 S-i.—
For the CEE countries, the economic calculations involved with 
membership are not only based on specific industry costs or benefits, but instead 
pertain to the overarching structure of their economies. There was a similar 
pattern of attitudes in the second enlargement. This emphasis on lamer 
economic-reforms rather than particular sector benefits developed for two 
reasons. First, in the case of Spain and Portugal, these economies were emerging 
from almost two decades of state bureaucracy/authoritarian rule. The EU would 
help guide these new market institutions through their infancy. Second, these 
citizens were clearly more isolated from the other countries of western Europe. 
Thus, attitudes about the EC tended to follow general opinions of market 
liberalization and economic affiliation with the West, rather than industry 
specific benefits (Tsoukalis 1981: Duchene 1982: Vaitsos 1982). j^C  
membership was perceived as ensuring the liberalization of economic markets 
by modernizinn a system which suffered from the burdens of state bureaucracy 
(Vaitsos 1982). To the extent that CEE citizens are confronted with a similar 
situation, we may expect a similar effect on public attitudes towards European 
integration. Thus, those citizens that hold a favorable opinion of free market 
reforms in their country, will welcome the permanence of this system through ^  
Integration with the capita 1 isf niarkeTs 'in the Wesl. Therefore, we might expect: 
The more-CEE-citrzi’tis plVoT'free market reforms the more they are likely to 




























































































Cognitive Capabilities and Human Capital
A value perspective can also enlighten our understanding of central and eastern 
European attitudes. Inglehart's (1970: 1977) cognitive mobilization hypothesis 
asserts that individual's possessing high levels of political awareness and 
communication skills are better able to understand, and identify with a 
supranational community. This is based on two assumptions, first, that a 
relatively high degree of cognitive skills are needed to understand the 
implications and effects of European integration. Second, inglehart contends 
that cognitive mobilization affects an individual's world view. Individuals 
possessing higher cognitive capabilities will be more cosmopolitan in their 
perspective and knowledgeable of abstract political issues. His empirical studies 
on citizen attitudes in member states reinforced these conclusions (1970: 1977).
He also found that levels of education and occupational status are l inked-to 
cognitive mobilization, as those w ith higher status occupations and incomes tend ...
to be better educated^ and better informed about politics, and more a c tiv e_
politically than their compatriots.
How'ever, in terms of occupation and education, this "cognitive 
mobilization” argument complements rather than rivals the utilitarian 
explanation. Scholars argue that individuals possessing a high level of "human 
capital” are better equipped to reap the benefits of integration (Gabel 1998). 
Primarily, these include occupations that are advantaged by the liberalization 
and integration of markets. A survey carried out in 1957 and 1962 in the six 
member states, demonstrated that business groups were consistently more 
favorable to the Common Market than were agriculture and labor groups 
(Shepherd 1975. p. 204). As liberalization of trade becomes a reality in these 
CEE countries, the integration of labor markets is seen as the following step 
(Barnes and Barnes 1995).
jin the central and eastern European case, occupational status may also 
play a significant role in informing and structuring general political values and 
opinionCabout the EU (Lieven T997). As the various economic sectors become ~~~ 
aware of the positiw and negative repercussions associated with integration, 
sector leaders are informing their constituencies of this impact. To the extent 
that the CEE agriculture community has voiced their opposition to EU 
membership, we might expect an individual working in the agrarian sector to 
possess political attitudes that are less favorable to integration.
Furthermore, the former technocratic elite, descendants of the 
precommunist middle class, and those involved in the second economy under 
state socialism are most likely to be more receptive and open to integration into 




























































































capabilities are hypothesized to be the bureaucratic elite, the poor and most 
manual workers (Nee 1989: Szelenyi and Kostello 1996: Walder 1996). Current 
connections with the West, such as the European Agreements, have made the 
EU a less distant reality to certain citizens. Thus, individuals working in a sector 
of the economy that is openly more favorable to integration will be more 
positive about EU membership. Also, if this perspective is right we would 
expect those individuals with higher education levels to be more accepting of 
integration, as they are more engaged in political discussions and stand to gain 
greater employment opportunities through integration. PaiU-Scholarship has-
drawn_a_causal link between_an—individual's cognitive rnpnKnTfles---ftftd.---- ^
occupation and their attitudes towarris-Fnrnpenn integruinn .-Thus we might 
expect a similar effect on central and eastern European attitudes towards 
membership in the EU. Therefore, we might expect to find that those: CEE 
citizens with higher levels o f education and whose occupational sector is 
favorable to integration are more likely to support membership in the European
Umo"■ ^ « 4  U>- 5 4
Political Partisanship
We can also examine how political values, as embedded in party politics, serves 
as a proxy for EU support attitudes. In the past, there w;as an assumption that 
political parties had little impact on EU politics (Hix 1995). This assumption 
seemed to be confirmed by studies that found little correlation between support 
for integration and left/right party affiliations (Featherstone 1988: Wessels 
1995). However, recent scholarship dispels this argument, and provides new 
evidence that party politics matter to European integration (Anderson 1998; 
Franklin. Marsh. & McLaren 1994: Rattinger 1994: Taggart 1998). Generally, 
these studies concur that support does not align on a left/right cleavage, yet they 
find political parties playing an increasingly important role in attitude formation.
They find that explicit opposition to European integration by an anti­
establishment or new party leaves its supporters less favorable to integration. 
Whereas, supporters x>f establishment parties are more likely to favor 
integration.
What does this tell us about party politics and EU attitudes in applicant 
countries? We can hypothesize that partisanship matters for three reasons. First, 
political parties espouse political positions that reflect their supporters political 
opinions more generally and in particular, about EU membership. Thus, if a 
political party opposes EU membership one would expect its supporters to hold 
a similar view. This is consistent with Anderson’s (1998) findings that argue 
party support structures preferences regarding European integration. We can 
then look to levels of party support as a “proxy” for EU membership support. 



























































































or hindered through integration. However, popular knowledge of these interests 
can be limited, and thus citizens rely on the positions espoused by political 
parties. The public debates in Greece prior to membership illustrate this 
dynamic. These debates were highly enmeshed in part)’ politics. The political 
parties and their charismatic leaders served as the main influence in constructing-^ 
and informing political attitudes as civil society' and more widespread political 
o rg a n iz a t io n s  had  yet to develop in -th is  n n vvly Hr'm n r rn l i z in n  r n n n t r y  (Tsoukalis 
1981). Finally, it is increasingly evident that political partisanship matters to the 
EU accession process. Referenda have in the recent past been fought along 
partisan lines.
In the five countries. politicaLparties generally include statements in their 
party programs regarding their position on EU membership. In the Czech 
Republic, three of the main political parties state firm support for integration 
with the west (Bugge 1994). The Civic Democratic Party led by Vaclav Klaus 
“seeks Czech integration in western economic, political and military structures" 
(Bugge 1994, p. 165). Unlike the western model, the Communist Party of 
Bohemia clearly states in its program that it accepts “the perspective of joining 
the EU” (Bugge 1994, p. 166). Conversely, the Czech Liberal National Social 
Party is less concerned with integration into the West: instead, the party takes a 
more conservative view to reform emphasizing its nationalistic roots.1’
In. Hungary and Poland, political parties that align themselves with a
statements supporfing integration-in their programs  The Hungarian Socialist 
Party “supports EU membership”, w'hile the Hungarian Alliance of Young 
Democrats makes a more urgent call for the "rapid integration with the EU and 
NATO” (Pittaway and Swain 1994. p. 208). The Polish UW is also described as 
“fervently pro-European and pro-NATO” (Millard 1994. p. 333). Furthermore, 
parties representing rural or agricultural issues are less supportive of EU 
membership. The Hungarian Independent Smallholder’s Party opposes foreign 
investment and the Slovenian SLS advocates agriculture and rural issues with no 
explicit position on EU membership (Pittaway and Swain 1994; Allock 1994). 
Single issue parties, such as the Czech Pensioner’s Movement for Security in 
Life and the Estonian Pensioner’s and Families Union, are also ambivalent in 
their political positions toward EU membership. Instead their programs focus on 
immediate domestic issues affecting pensioners (Norgaard. Johannsen & 
Pedersen 1994; Bugge 1994). If political party support serves as a proxy for 
attitudes regarding European integration, we would expect these party positions 
to have a predictable impact on levels of EU support. Therefore, we hypothesize 
that: Supporters o f political parties taking favorable positions toward European 






























































































To test these hypotheses. I utilize rried out in 20 countries
from central and eastern Europe tern Eurobarometer 7.0
(CEEB). The survey was coordinated with the help of GFK EUROPE/ Ad hoc 
Research in cooperation with Fessel and GFK Austria. Data processing was 
undertaken by GFK Data Services Germany. The analyses utilize the data 
collected for the Czech Republic. Estonia. Hungary. Poland and Slovenia in the 
Fall 1996. Each country survey includes a sample of around 1000 persons who 
were interviewed in their homes. The surveys are nationally representative. This 
data set is particularly insightful to this study as it enables us to avoid many of 
the problems confronted by comparative public opinion research: that is. 
inconsistent wording across independent surveys or changes in sampling 
procedures. Instead, the CEEB represents a series of cross-national surveys 
possessing identical questions and procedures that were carried out 
systematically across these applicant countries. Furthermore, this survey 
provides us with a set of questions regarding general EU support attitudes 
alongside the more specific economic and political measures utilized in previous 
EU public opinion research.10
To indicate support tor integration, /the analysis uses a general question 
regarding future membership in the European Union. This serves as the 
dependent variable throughout the study. The question is as follows:
If there were to be a referendum tomorrow on the question of (OUR
COUNTRY'S) membership in the European Union, would you personally
vote for or against membership?
( I ) vote for membership (2) undecided (3) vote against membership
Figure 1 presents the general attitudes toward EU membership across all five 
countries. The most interesting part of this figure is that the comparison shows 
an overwhelming base support for integration. Furthermore, those citizens who 
are clearly against EU membership appear to be at a low level in all five 
countries. Although not a clear majority, this positive consensus bids well for 
membership referenda in the near future. While there is a clear foundation of 
support, the data also show a definite variation in aggregate levels. The high 
levels of Polish support may be attributed to a public consensus across the 
political spectrum that European integration is a necessary step for Poland’s 
future. Furthermore, the ’undecided” category is also particularly instructive in 
the case of central and eastern Europe. Public opinion scholars agree that 
surveys demonstrating low' levels of EU interest and knowledge in these 
countries should not be interpreted as isolationist (Rose & Haerpfer 1995). 
Instead, being linked both economically and politically to the F.U is a new 




























































































important so that lower levels of support are not misinterpreted. Estonian low 
levels of support are not necessarily a result of decided opposition, but instead 
represent an amount of uncertainty. This may be a result of the "socialization 
effect", as Estonian links to the West are comparatively new.
THE ROOTS OF CITIZEN SUPPORT FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION
We have seen that certain factors, both utilitarian and value based can impact 
citizen attitude's of support for the European Union. The hypotheses posited in 
the previous section suggest predictable outcomes regarding the effects ot 
utilitarian and political value factors on support for integration. The following 
bivariate and multivariate analyses will test the explanatory value of utilitarian., 
and value based predictors in understanding citizen attitudes in central and
gneft-j-n  P n r n p p .—
F ig u r e  1 Support for Membership i s  the E iropea.x L xio.x by Coixtry





























































































1 hypothesized that an
\
individual's - perceived 
influence their support for European integration.This is a particularly salient 
issue in the five CEE countries as their domestic economies have undergone 
considerable flux in the last five years and one's financial well-being stands to 
be evaluated as an effect of these reforms. As membership in the EU represents 
a further extension of these economic and political reforms (market 
liberalization, in particular), one might expect that an individual's favorable 
evaluation of their personal financial stntnc will hp p n c it ivp ly  rplmprl tn cnppnrt  
for El ( membership.
c^e
Table 1 demonstrates how perceptions of financial well-being impact 
support for EU membership. Estonian ambivalence is evident since only 35 
percent of those believing that their household financial situation was improved 
supported membership in the EU. Whereas, their Polish counterparts were 
considerably more decided and favorable. 40 percent more, with nearly 70 
percent of those with perceived worsened conditions still favoring integration. 
The Hungarian data reveal similar patterns, as those possessing negative 
evaluations of their financial status are 20 percent less likely to support 
integration than their positive outlook counterparts. In general, the data 
demonstrate that individuals possessing positive evaluations of their household 
financial status are more likely to support future membership in the European 
Union. They view integration as an extension of the positive benefits they have 
so far received from the liberalization and transformation of their national
economies. Thus, these attitudes regarding economic well-being may become a 
dasis for individual attitudes about European integration.
In addition to potential economic benefits, the European Union also
related tu..uie. newly~created democratic.presents citizens w
institutions. Table 2 explores the impact that attitudes towards democracy had 
on a citizen’s support for EU membership. The analysis uses a general question 
on satisfaction with democracy to tesFthësë attitudes.1 '
Table 2 demonstrates that individuals satisfied with democratic 
development are almost 20 percent more likely to support integration than their 
unsatisfied counterparts. Out of respondents who are satisfied with 
democratization, Polish respondents are almost twice as confident of their future 
in the European Union as their Estonian counterparts. Conversely, when looking 
at those individuals who are against membership, the results show that across all 
five countries more unsatisfied citizens hold this opinion than do those 




























































































These data also present a general trend that is of significant importance to 
the stability of democracy in this region. Citizens are clearly unsatisfied with the 
way democracy is developing in their country. In the case of Hungary, 
dissatisfaction is almost four times as frequent as the contentment with 
democracy. Estonia and Slovenia show similar levels with almost a third more 
respondents dissatisfied with democracy. Citizens have drawn the link between 
this dissatisfaction and EU membership. These data would suggest that citizens- 
look to the EU to help strengthen their democracy in the hopes of quelling their 
dissatisfaction. We can only hope, for the sake of democratic 
region, that theEU "dreams" can meet up to their expectations.
In addition to stabilizing democratic institutions. CEE citizens look to the 
European Union to consolidate capitalism and free market reforms in their 
countries. Membership in the EU represents the permanence and stability of 
liberal market institutions in the five countries. However, this public opinion and 
knowledge of capitalism is based on the personal experiences of these CEE 
citizens. As earlier hypothesized, one might expect individuals who favor free 
market reforms in their country to be more likely to support membership in the
I T "
Table 3 demonstrates the relationship, between_individual attitudes
regarding a free market economy and levels of EU support. 14 Of those 
individuals believing the free market is right for their country. 60 percent 
support integration whereas only 40 percent of their anti-free market 
counterparts favor integration. These data also detect a general level of 
uncertainty surrounding evaluations of a free market economy. In the Czech 
Republic. Hungary and Slovenia, aggregate levels of free market supporters are 
similar to the levels of individuals possessing negative attitudes about market 
liberalization. While differing on their certainty about integration. Estonian and 
Polish attitudes are clearly in agreement that the free market is right for their 
country.
It is also interesting to note that over half of the Polish respondents, who 
believe the free market is wrong, also favor membership in the EU. One 
wonders how “Western dreams” have become detached from the reality of 
western capitalism. Consistently across all countries there is a generalizable 
relationship between an individual’s attitude on the free market and their support 
for EU membership. The data suggest that an individual’s positive attitudes 
toward a free market economy may form the basis for greater levels of support 




























































































T able 1 S i  p p o r t  f o r  Me m b e r s h i p  in t h e  E l r o p e a n
UNION BY EVALUATION' OF HOUSEHOLD FINANCIAL STATUS
Improved Worsened r
Czech Republic
Favor EC 56.4 35.3 .2 1 -
Against EU 7.5 19.5
(N) (241) (329)
Estonia
Favor EU 34.6 23.1 .11"
Against EU 12.2 18.1
(N) (286) (360)
Hungary
Favor EU 65.4 45.1 .13**
Against EU 7.7 17.4
(N) (52) (720)
Poland
Favor EU 75.5 69.9 .06 >
Against EU 6.0 7.1
(N) (200) (382)
Slovenia
Favor EU 55.9 44.2 .10-
Against EU 13.2 20.0
(N) (152) (405)
Note: ‘Undecided’ and Stayed the same' categories are included in the
calculation of percentages hut are excluded from this table
r= Pearson correlation coefficients
♦Significance at the .05 level
•♦Significance at the .01 level




























































































T able 2 S c p p o r t  f o r  M e m b e r s h i p  i s  t h e  E l r o p e a s





Favor EU 61.0 8.0 37.7 .26*-
Against EU 6.2 16.0 14.0
(N) (418) (25) (578)
Estonia
Favor EU 35.6 21.2 27.5 .18“
Against EU 11.0 - 19.0
(N) (438) (33) (600)
Hungary
Favor EU 60.7 28.1 45.5 .20**
Against EU 9.7 3.1 19.3
(N) (206) (64) (732)
Poland
Favor EU 81.1 56.6 66 7 .17**
Against EU 4.8 6.1 9.7
(N) (439) (99) (466)
Slovenia
Favor EU 61.3 17.1 42.6 .20**
Against EU 12.3 2.4 19.4
(N) (470) (41) (603)
Note: ■Undecided’ category arc included in the calculation of percentages but
are excluded from this table.
r= Pearson correlation coefficients
’"’"Significance at the .01 level




























































































T a b l e  3  S upport for Membership ix the Europeax 
Uxiox by A ttitudes of Whether a Free Market 





Favor EU 62.2 31.1 34.7
Against EU 7.2 5.4 16.9
(N) (458) (148) (415)
Estonia
Favor EU 34.6 18.2 26.0 .2 0 -
Against EU 16.9 9.1 13.9
(N) (611) (99) (361)
Hungary
Favor EU 65.1 33.3 39.5 .2 8 -
Against EU 10.1 12.1 28.2
(N) (387) (306) (309)
Poland
Favor EU 81.5 60.4 51.9 .2 3 -
Against EU 6.1 5.7 11.5
(N) (637) (159) (208)
Slovenia
Favor EU 59.5 35.2 43.3 .22**
Against EU 13.7 14.2 19.0
(N) (518) (176) (420)
Note: ‘Undecided' category arc included in the calculation of percentages hut
are excluded from this table.
r= Pearson correlation coefficients
♦•Significance at the .01 level




























































































Cognitive and Value Predictors
As earlier discussed, the cognitive mobilization hypothesis tells us that the 
prospects of integration become more understandable and thus more supported, 
by the better educated. Furthermore. 1 hypothesized that individuals with higher 
levels of education are better able to adapt to changes that accompany 
integration and also more likely to benefit from the opportunities afforded 
through integration.
Table 4 illustrates that education level is positively related to support for 
ihe EU across all five countries. Czech citizens possessing advanced levels of 
education are almost twice as likely to support membership in the ELI as their 
counterparts with only an elementary education. While Estonian levels of 
support are decidedly lower, the results show that all individuals possessing at 
least a secondary degree are almost 20 percent more supportive of integration 
than their elementary educated counterparts. Support for membership in the EU 
remains at a fairly constant level amongst Slovenians, if slightly elevated 
amongst the educated elite.
Table 5 reveals a distinct pattern between occupation and EU support. 
Individuals in occupations involving the private sector or civil service are on 
average more supportive of integration than other sectors. Farmers are more 
decided than any other sector on opposing membership in the EU. Across the 
five countries, an average of almost 20 percent of farmers is opposed to further 
integration with Western Europe. Similarly, on average pensioners possess 10 
percent lower support levels than civil servants. When examining EU support 
attitudes across countries within occupation, we see how Polish Euro-optimism 
has influenced even the most down trodden, the unemployed. More generally, 
the unemployed population is skeptical of integration, as the Czech and Estonian 
data demonstrate, because they have already experienced the hardship associated 
with market reforms. Consistent with previous research, these data suggest that 
occupation may be a significant factor in determining an individual's attitudes 
towards European integration.
Finally, the data in Table 6 suggests that party politics may play a 
significant role in structuring central and eastern European attitudes about 
integration, ^exam ined this relationship through a question which asks 
respondents to declare which political party they currently support.15 From 
accounts of past enlargements, we know that political parties in applicant^ 
countries often provide key political cues to citizens which are crucial to their 
general attitudes about the EU. The political parties also reflect a set of values 




























































































Table 6 illustrates the relationship between partisan attachments and EU 
support. Political parties that represented a clear position on EU support were 
more likely to have supporters who favor EU membership. The ROP embodies 
Polish nationalistic interests which currently envision a Poland strengthened 
through integration into Western markets. Similarly, the Czech data reveal that 
the most pro-European parties, the Communist Party and the Civic Democratic 
Part)', have supporters who are more favorable to EU membership. The 
Hungarian Socialist Party and Alliance for Young Democrats supporters are 
clearly more decided on support for EU membership than their counterparts. 
Estonian respondents were clearly undecided on EU support. Estonian political 
parties at the time of this study had not included positions on EU integration in 
their party programs and thus we would expect a weak relationship between 
partisanship and EU support in this case.
Ambivalence and opposition to EU membership are also clearly- 
associated with single issue and agrarian party supporters. The Czech 
Pensioner’s Movement for Security members were clearly more undecided on 
EU integration than the other four political parties. Similarly, the Hungarian 
Independent
______________________________—------ -
Smallholder’s Party supporters, whose party firmly opposed foreign 
investment and represent agrarian interests, possess lower levels of support for 
EU membership. The Slovenian SLS. which advocates rural and agriculture 
issues rather than concerning itself with larger international issues, appears to 
reflect its supporters’ EU attitudes. These individuals are not only less likely to 
support EU membership, but are more likely than the other political party 
supporters to remain undecided over integration. Generally, the data suggest 
political party support may serve as a proxy for attitudes regarding European 
integration. Supporters of parties representing explicit favorable positions on EU 
membership were more likely to possess higher levels of support for the 
integration project. As much as these newly developing political parties can be 
categorized on a left/right scheme, the data confirm recent scholarship that 





























































































T a b l e  4  Percestage Favorixg Membership is the Elropeax L'xtox b y Edi catiox 
Level
Elementary Some Secondar) Higher
Secondarv Graduated Education
9c (N ) 9c ( N ) 9c ( N ) 9 , ( N i r
Czech Republic 3 8 . 0 ( 8 4 ) 4 2 . 7 ( 1 6 2 ) 5 2 . 0 ( 1 6 7 ) 6 0 . 8 ( 5 9 ) .18*
Estonia 1 8 .6 ( 1 9 ) 2 8 . 6 ( 6 5 ) 3 2 . 5 ( 1 8 9 ) 3 4 . 2 ( 5 5 ) .1 5 *
Hungary 3 7 . 8 ( 1 4 0 ) 5 2 . 0 ( 1 3 1 ) 5 1 . 5 ( 1 3 8 ) 5 9 . 8 ( 6 7 ) .2 1 *
*
Poland 6 2 . 6 ( 1 4 2 ) 6 9 . 6 ( 2 1 5 ) 76 .1 ( 2 8 4 ) 8 6 .3 ( 8 2 ) .17*
*
Slovenia 4 6 . 8 ( 1 1 8 ) 4 4 .1 ( 8 9 ) 4 9 . 6 ( 2 2 9 ) 5 8 . 6 ( 1 1 6 ) .1 3 *
*
r= Pearson correlation coefficients 
Significance at the .01 level



























































































Table 5 S u p p o r t  f o r  M e m b e r s h i p  i s  t h e  E u r o p e a s  Us i o s  b y  O c c i  p a t i o s
Ci\il Private Private Agrarian Pensioner Unemployed
Service Owner Emplovee
Czech Republic
Favor EU 65.9*3 64.8*3 45.1*3 29.6*3 37.6*3 26.3*3
Against EU 2.3 13.0 12.2 18.5 11.8 15.8
(N) (44) (54) (237) (27) (186) (19)
Estonia
Favor EU 36.5 42.5 27.7 25.0 26.5 31.3
Against EU 18.2 12.3 20.7 18.2 15.2 12.5
(N) (159) (73) (213) (44) (230) (80)
Hungary
Favor EU 54.9 46.2 50.9 45.0 42.2 50.0
Against EU 9.9 26.9 17.0 20.0 14.0 21.9
(N) (91) (52) (112) (20) (422) (96)
Poland
Favor EU 90.4 82.1 71.8 50.6 70.2 75.4
Against EU 5.8 5.4 4.6 19.1 6.3 5.8
(N) (52) (56) (131) (89) (272) (69)
Slovenia
Favor EU 45.5 47.0 57.5 57.1 53.2 50.7
Against EU 17.6 25.8 17.8 21.4 11.1 20.9
IN) (176) (66) (73) (14) (333) (67)
Note: ’Undecided' category and other occupational categories are included in the calculation of percentages hut are 
excluded trom this table.




























































































Table 6 S u p p o r t  f o r  M e m b e r s h i p  in  t h e  E u r o p e a n  Un i o n  b y  P o l i t i c a l  Pa r t i s a n s h i p
Political Partins
1 2 3 4 5
Czech Communist Party Liberal National Civic Democratic Czech-Moravian Pensioner’s
Republic of Bohemia Social Party Party Union o f the Movement for
(Communist) (Socialist) (Right Liberal) Center Security in
(Regional) Life
(Single issue)
Favor EU 72.1 22.5 68.5 71.4 50.7
Undecided 23.3 25.0 23 3 23.4 31.6
Against EU 4.7 52.5 8.2 5.2 17.8
(N) (43) (40) (73) (192) (152'
Estonia Estonia Center Party Estonia Reform Party Pensioner's and »
(Liberal) (Right Liberal) Families Union
(Single issue)
Favor EU 38.3 38.1 27.5
Undecided 35.0 43.3 51.0
Against EU 26.7 18.7 21.6
(N) (60) (134) (51)
H ungary Hungarian Socialist Alliance of Christian Democratic Independent
Party Young Democrats People's Party Smallholder’
(Social Democratic) (Liberal) (Christian Democratic) s Party 
(Agrarian)
Favor EU 70.0 65.9 65.2 56.7
Undecided 15.8 11.0 10.9 19.6
Against EU 14.2 23.2 23.9 23.7
(N) (120) (82) (82) (97)
Poland SLD u w ROP UPR
(Socialist) (Liberal) (Nationalist) (Right Liberal)
Favor EU 64.4 66 7 83.3 83.4
Undecided 21.9 15.7 LOO 9.5
Against EU 13.7 17.6 6.7 7.1
(N) (73) (51) (150) (169)
Slovenia SDS i .n s SLS
(Social Democratic) (Liberal) (Christian 
Democia ic)
Favor EU 55.7 71.7 43.6
Undecided 17.0 17.9 30.9
Against EU 27.3 10.4 25.5
(N) (88) (307) (110)
Note: This table includes the political parties from each country which received at least 5% of respondent support General 
political party family classifications for each party appear in parentheses.




























































































Predicting Citizen Support for European Integration
Conclusions drawn from the /ses are confirmed by the
analyses. Furthermore, a muLti variate analysis can give us a more precise 
understanding of whether findings associated with the utilitarian and political 
value models hold when applied to the publics of central and eastern Europe and 
also test their independent explanatory power when controlling for the effects of ± 
the other variables. In order to demonstrate the relative impact of given 
variables, while controUkia for the effects of others. 1 used Multiple 
Classification Analyses;'(McX). Support for EU membership is the dependent 
variable in these analysesrTne analyses combine the three utilitarian predictor 
variables (economic perception, satisfaction with democracy, and attitudes 
toward capitalism) and the three cognitive/ political value variables (education 
level, occupation, and political partisanship) into a multivariate analyses in all 
five countries.1 Table 7 reports the predicted mean level of support for 
membership in the EU within the respective categories of the predictor 
variables, and also the summary statistics of the MCA.
The~data suggest that two potential factors influencing EU support in CEE 
applicant countries can be dismissed by these results^ First, when combined with 
the other variables, generally, the economic perceptions of CEE citizens may not 
be a significant factor promoting greater support for EU membership at the 
individual level. While individual financial well-being appears to have an 
independent effect on Czech attitudes towards European integration, its effect on 
attitudes in the other four countries are considerably weaker, if not insignificant. 
These findings may provide further evidence for recent scholarship that
questions the strength of economic variables in explaining citizen attitudes 
towards the European Union (e.g. Duch & Taylor 1997). Second, while 
occupational status has served as a cue for negative or positive attitudes towards 
further integration in western Europe, this factor may not be a defining predictor 
amongst central and eastern Europeans. Furthermore, these findings demonstrate 
that the most dominant utilitarian andwalue-predietofs-ffdlavw-a different-pattern _ 
than found in member state public opinion. .
The analyses of Table 7 suggest that the pro-EU attitudes of central and 
eastern Europeans arise from a combination of both utilitarian and political 
value factors. Attitudes towards democracy and free market economy prove to 
be two of the strongest utnitarian predictors across all five cdunfriesTThis holds 
true of both the zero-order relationship (as noted by the eta coefficients) and the 
partial relationship, controlling for the effects of all the other predictors included 
in the analysis (as noted by the beta coefficients). The impact of democracy and 
capitalism is not a spurious one; it is not related to the fact thautjrose^salisfiertf 




























































































Instead, the EU symbolizes the future institutional strengt
capitalism in these countries. Consistent with earlier analyses of the 
Mediterranean enlargement, the data suggest that an individual's evaluation of 
democratization and market liberalization becomes a powerful link to their 
support for European integration.
partisanship has on popular attitudes regarding EU membership. Consistent with 
studies on member state publics, the data suggests that party support may serve 
as a proxy for central and eastern European attitudes towards European 
integration. What is distinctive about this effect, however, is that it does not 
follow a left-right pattern and it is not necessarily linked to support for 
establishment parties. Instead, as the bivariate analyses demonstrated, support is 
linked to a party's public position on EU membership, rather than general 
patterns of left Euro-skepticism and right optimism. While the effect is slightly 
weaker in Estonia, the public debates between political parties on EU 
membership in all five countries had considerable impact on party supporter 
attitudes. Similar to the patterns found in the earlier EC enlargements, the data 
suggest that independent of personal economic factors or even education level. 
CEE citizen's positive support for EU membership may to a significant extent 
be driven by support for political parties with clearly defined pro-European 
positions.
Membership in the European Union remains a pending decision for the citizens 
of central and eastern Europe. The results presented in this article indicate an 
overwhelming base support for EU membership across all five applicant 
countries. Although not a clear majority. this positive consensus bids well for
enthusiastically prime themselves for membership, the individual level data 
warns that the enthusiasm is not shared by all citizens. In particular, pensioners 
and farmers are clearly more skeptical about their future as “Europeans”. This is 
confirmed by a recent study of the Hungarian agriculture community which 
showed that EU membership “casts a shadow” amongst farmers, an attitude 
which comes in stark contrast to the perceptions of the country’s “raring to go” 
image as a whole (Lieveil 1997). The findings in this article help explain these 
conflicting attitudes.
The janalyses suggest that citizen _supporLJbf—Eutopeair-mtegration-io-^ 
central and eastern European applicant countries is influenced.by a combination . 
of both utilitarian and political value factors. The research provides new insights
The data also demonstrate the strong independent




























































































to utilitarian models by expanding their explanatory capacity beyond 
conventional economic variables: and furthermore, it complements recent public 
opinion scholarship which conceptualizes support for European integration as a 
combination of domestic political factors (Anderson 1998). Equally important, 
the findings may demonstrate the limitations of public opinion models 
developed for member state publics when directly transferred to applicant 
countries. I will list these conclusions as a set of broader lessons for integration 
scholars.
First, the research demonstrates that European integration can mean 
different things to different people. While this is arelatrvely simple concept 
public opinion models may distort, or completely miss, this nuance by assuming 
a set of benefits for all publics. Furthermore, this can be subject to greater 
variation when examining applicant countries, as these citizens' experience with 
and knowledge of the EL1 can be even more limited than a member state 
populous. The findings suggest that in the case of central and eastern Europe, 
the strongest utilitarian factors shaping attitudes are not based on measures of 
specific industry economic benefit.
attitudes toward democracy and free market economy ai
predictors of support for the EU. Citizens who are satisfied with the democratic 
transition in their country and favor a free market economy may be more likely 
to favor future membership in the EU. In the CEE context. EU membership may 
not only be viewed in terms of living standard increases: instead, and even more 
significantly it is viewed as a means of strengthening the institutional base for 
democracy and capitalism. This pattern is consistent with citizen attitudes in the 
newly democratizing Mediterranean states involved in the second enlargement.
Secondly, the results suggest that political parties are playing an 
increasingly important role in influencing public attitudes towards Europe. 
Consistently-across-all-five countries, political partisanship was the strongest 
predictor of citizen attitudes, next to democracy and free market economy. The 
results presented in this article lend support to a growing body of research 
arguing that political parties matter to integration (Anderson 1998; Rattmger 
1994: Taggart 1998). The data suggests, that amongst central and eastern 
European citizens, party support structures preferences regarding EU 
membership. Such evidence may help us better understand variation in public 
opinion, and provide a clearer explanation of why economic conditions may 
have a more limited and indirect effect on levels of EU support.
Equally of interest, the party data provide further evidence of why we 
must look beyond general left-right partisan attachments to understand how




























































































party politics is important to EU accession. The analysis suggests that regardless 
of ideology, citizen attitudes in these central and eastern European countries are 
most affected by partisanship in terms of a political party's position on European 
integration. Thus, a political party that took a clear public position on support 
for EU membership was more likely to have supporters who were also clearly 
decided on support for integration, regardless of left-right ideology. An 
endorsement of the EU by the Czech Communist Party left its supporters as 
favorable to integration, as the more right-liberal Civic Democratic Paru 
supporters, whose party also made a clear declaration of integration with the 
West. The fact that all Estonian parties lacked a public position on integration at 
the time of the survey, may also help explain the uncertainty of EU attitudes 
amongst this populous. The most basic lesson we leant from this data is that, in 
applicant countries, voters mav use party attachment as a proxy to answer 
questions on EU membership, _
Furthermore, given the relative paucity of public opinion research in 
applicant countries, this analysis also provides a foundation for future research 
in this area and suggests some promising avenues of inquiry.18 The research 
design utilized data collected at one point in time to examine the general logic 
determining central and eastern European citizen attitudes about Europe. Thus, 
while the findings reveal a distinct pattern in citizen attitudes at the time of my 
study, I would expect these to change over time. Citizen altitudes re-garfhTfg 
domestic institutions^let alone European integration, are in their infancy in these 
newly democratizing countries. As more reliable time series data becomes
available, our IcRoïarship. would be enriched by an examination of these__
attitudes over time. Furthermore, interesting research questions surround the 
effect that the greater consolidation of political and economic domestic reforms 
would have on citizen attitudes. Will political parties play a different mediating 
role as citizens begin to gain more personal experience with the EU as accession 
reforms are implemented? Will popular attitudes in applicant countries begin to 
resemble patterns found in member state countries the longer a country is 
engaged in EU reforms and trade? Similarly, as the data becomes available, 
studies examining support for specific EU policy areas might also elicit a more 
nuanced understanding of attitudes in applicant countries, as demonstrated-hv 
previous research on public opinion in member states (Eîclïenberg. .&. Dalton 
1998).
From another perspective, the analysis contributes _tu...lhc larger 
^comparative'politics literature through the examination of the interplay between 
domestic politics and international relations. Recent scholarship has alerted 
students of both comparative politics and international relations to the powerful 
constraints that domestic politics can have on a state’s behavior in the 




























































































1995: Keohane & Milner 1996). Yet this scholarship focuses primarily on the 
impact that domestic politics has on national governments as international
actors.
As we begin to observe a general blurring of domestic and international 
political processes, especially in Europe, our scholarship can no longer ignore 
the crucial impact that citizens, as domestic and international actors, can exert 
on both national and international policy outcomes (Caporaso 1997). Thus, 
democratization in central and eastern Europe is not separate from larger 
supranational political and economic reforms in Europe: and as the analyses 
demonstrate, the citizens of these newly democratizing countries are acutely 
aware of this connection and can exert considerable constraints on it. Their 
favorable attitudes towards domestic political and market reforms are essential 
for their continued support for integration. However, as the hardships incurred 
from these reforms become a greater reality than the earlier dreams of 
democracy and capitalism: this research suggests we. misht also expect a decline 
in. support forintegration. Eastern enlargement of the European Union lsnot-the 
only project that could suffer from such an outcome. Instead, as the findings 
demonstrate, these mass attitudes are equally linked to the stability of 
democracy in Europe as a whole.
Rachel A. Cichowski 
Department of Political Science 
University of California 
Irvine. CA 92697-5100 


































































































Edu. Occup. Pol. Part
Czech Economic Perceptions 1 . 0 0 .35** .2 1 ** . 1 0 ** .05 .04
Republi Democracy .35** 1 . 0 0 .31** . 1 1 ** .04 1 1 **
c Free Market .2 1 ** .31** 1 . 0 0 . 1 2 ** .04 .03
Education .09** . 1 1 ** . 1 2 ** 1 . 0 0 .37** .2 6 **
Occupation .05 .0 1 .04 1 . 0 0 . 2 0
Political Partisanship .04 . 1 1 ** .03 .26** .2 0 ** 1 . 0 0
Estonia Economic Perceptions 1 . 0 0 .32** 2 i** .06 .05 . 1 2 "
Democracy .32** 1 . 0 0 .31** .09** .03 .14**
Free Market .21 ** .31** 1 . 0 0 .17** .07* .1 7 "
Education .06 .09** .17** 1 . 0 0 .34** .16**
Occupation .05 .03 .07** 3 4 ** 1 . 0 0
Political Partisanship . 1 2 ** .14** .17** .16** 1 . 0 0
Hungary Economic Perceptions 1 . 0 0 .30** . 1 0 ** . 1 1 ** .15*“ .08*
Democracy .30** 1 . 0 0 .15** .os* .04 . 1 0 "
Free Market .1 0 ** .15** 1 . 0 0 .26** . 1 1 *“ . 1 1 **
Education . 1 1 ** .08* .30** 1 . 0 0 .29** .15**
Occupation .15** .04 . 1 1 ** 29** 1 . 0 0 .03
Political Partisanship .08* . 1 0 ** . 1 1 ** .15** T | ** 1 . 0 0
Poland Economic Perceptions 1 . 0 0 .27** .18** .18** . 1 1 * * .0 2
Democracy .27** 1 . 0 0 -> ■}** . 1 0 ** .05 .14**
Free Market .18** .23** 1 . 0 0 T Q * * .09** .15**
Education . 1 1 ** . 1 0 ** .2 0 ** 1 . 0 0 27** .08**
Occupation . 0 2 .05 .09 27** 1 . 0 0 .08*
Political Partisanship .06* .14** .15** 08** .08* 1 . 0 0
Slovenia Economic Perceptions 1 . 0 0 .14** . 1 2 ** .03 .0 1
Democracy .25** 1 . 0 0 -> 0** . o s * .0 1 .09**
Free Market .14** .2 0 ** 1 . 0 0 .23** .05 .04
Education . 1 2 ** .08* .23** 1 . 0 0 .23** .18**
Occupation .03 . 0 2 .05 .23** 1 . 0 0 .08**
Political Partisanship .0 1 .09** .04 .18** .08** 1 . 0 0
•Significance at the .05 level
••Significance at the .01 level
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I Applicant countries and date of application: Hungary and Poland (1994); Bulgaria. Estonia. Latvia. 
Lithuania. Romania. Slovakia (1995): Czech Republic and Slovenia (1996).
Accession negotiation countries: Czech Republic. Estonia. Hungary. Poland, and Slovenia.
: The applicant countries are working with the EU to implement these economic conditions in a 
relationship which has become known as the "Accession Partnerships".
’ A recent American Political Science Association panel was dedicated to the topic of public opinion 
and European integration. At the Turin summit in 1996. the President of the European Council, 
emphasized that "citizens are at the core of the European construction" and that the EU must respond 
to their "needs and concerns".
4 The Central Eastern European States formed the Central European Free Trade Area (CEFTAi in 
1991. as a way to prepare for EU membership.
5 While this conclusion was derived from a political economic model of support, this hypothesis is 
congruent with the utilitarian argument posited by Gabel and Whitten (1997).
6 For a thorough discussion of these United States Information Agency public opinion polls see 
Shepherd 1975.
7 Unlike the previous predictor variables examined in this article, past research conceptualizes political 
party support as a proxy for levels of EU support rather than a casual determinant (see Anderson 
1998). Consistent with this research. 1 adopt a similar conceptualization for examining the impact of 
partisanship on EU support levels.
8 Formerly the Czechoslovak Socialist Party in 1948. this party has tried to rid itself of the image that 
is was subordinate ally of the Communist party in the National Front. Thus, it took a name change in 
1989 and moved further to the right representing a more liberal position.
9 The data was made available for this study by Hans-Dieter Klingemann of the Wissenschaftzentrum 
Berlin. It is now available through the Inter-Universitv Consortium for Political and Social Research. 
ICPSR Study 6835.
10 While the CEEB surveys have been carried out annually since 1990. these 5 applicant countries 
were not included in all of the earlier surveys. Furthermore. CEEB 7.0 is the first survey carried out 
after all 5 countries had established formal economic linkages with the EU (the last being Estonia in 
1995) and all had begun accession negotiations with the EU (the last being the Czech Republic and 
Slovenia in 1996). These are important factors as they provide citizens with at least enough first hand 
experience with EU relations to form attitudes about the subject. This survey is sufficient to test the 
propositions contained in this article. Further examination is needed to test whether these findings hold 
across time.
II Note that the independent variables possess both theoretically and empirically distinct effects on 
levels of EU support. As elaborated in the previous section, the variables included in these analyses 
are derived from an extensive literature which establishes their theoretical relevance to EU public 
opinion (e.g. Eichenberg 1998). Furthermore, from this research I've only included variables that are 
theoretically relevant to the central and eastern European case. While the variables are clearly all 
positively related, the overall bivariate correlations are fairly low'. See Appendix A.
141 used the following question to test this relationship: Compared to 12 months ago. do you think the 
financial situation of your household has...(1) Got a lot or a little better (2) Stayed the same (3) Got a 
little or a lot worse.
13 On the whole are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the 
way democracy is developing in (OUR COUNTRY)? (1) Very or fairly satisfied (2) Don't know (3) 
Not very or not at all satisfied.
14 To measure individual attitudes toward the free market I use the following question: Do you
personally feel that the creation of a free market economy, that is one largely free from state control, is 
right or wrong for (OUR COUNTRY'S) future? (1) Right (2) Don't know (3) Wrong.
15 If there were a General Election tomorrow, which party would you vote for. or might you be 




























































































16 Scholars have begun to categorize the new and evolving political parties of eastern and central 
Europe in terms of Western pany families (e.g. Klingemann 1997). However, as democratic party 
politics is still in its infancy in these countries it would be inaccurate to assume that citizen support for 
a particular political party necessarily correlates with an individual's self categorization on left-right 
alignment. General left/right data was not available in this survey: yet. I was able to code all political 
parties included in this analysis according to the party family classifications provided by the 
Klingemann data (1997). I have included these general classifications in Table 6. Thus, we are able to 
draw preliminary conclusions regarding the relationship between traditional left/right part) alignment 
and levels of EU support.
1 Additional demographic variables were included in preliminary analyses, but those which had 
neither theoretical or empirical significance were excluded from the final analyses.
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